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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EU FOREIGN POLICY ON CYPRUS: 
EXPLORING THE MEDIATION POTENTIAL 
 
ERALP, ULAŞ DOĞA 
 
M. A., Political Science 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Nimet Beriker 
 
JUNE 2002, viii + 57 pages 
 
This thesis is both an exploratory and descriptive case study on the European Union’s 
foreign policy involvement in the Cyprus conflict. A descriptive critique is conducted 
starting from the 90’s until present on the EU’s foreign policy involvement in Cyprus, 
articulated with terminology from negotiation and international mediation literature. 
In addition to the critique new policies and roles are offered for a more effective and 
flexible foreign policy in Cyprus from international mediation literature. This study 
reveals a discrepancy between the principles of the EU such as bringing peace, 
prosperity and security put forth as the promises of the enlargement project and EU 
policies resulting from the ineffective unanimity principle in the decision making 
system. This thesis argues that the use of international mediation tools enhances the 
effectiveness of the EU foreign policy not only in the case of Cyprus but also in other 
protracted ethnic conflicts, as an effective global political entity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Cyprus, disinterested neutral third party, interested secondary party, 
negotiation, international mediation, EU foreign policy, eastern enlargement project, 
CFSP, unanimity 
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ÖZ 
 
KIBRIS’TAKİ AB DIŞ POLİTIKASI: 
ARABULUCULUK POTANSIYELININ KEŞFİ 
ERALP, ULAŞ DOĞA  
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nimet Beriker 
HAZİRAN 2002, viii + 57 sayfa 
 
Bu tez Avrupa Birliği’nin Kıbrıs sorunu çerçevesindeki dış politikasına keşfeden ve 
tanımlayıcı bir yöntemle yaklaşmaktadır. AB’nin 90’ların başından beri Kıbrs’ta 
sürdürdüğü dış politikanın uluslararası müzakere ve arabuluculuk literatüründen 
çıkarılmış tanımların aracılığıyla eleştirel bir analizi yapılmıştır. Bu eleştirinin üzerine 
de AB’ye daha etkin ve esnek bir dış politika izleyebilmesine olanak tanıyan yeni 
uluslararası arabuluculuk literatüründen politikalar ve roller önerilmektedir. Bu 
çalışma ayrıca AB’nin doğuya doğru genişleme projesiyle vaadedilmiş olan barış, 
güvenlik ve zenginlik gibi  prensipleri ile Kıbrıs’ta uygulamakta olduğu politikanın 
çeliştiğini öne sürmektedir. Bunun temelinde de Avrupa Birliği’nin karar verme 
mekanizmasındaki oybirliğini esas alan sistemin olduğunu varsaymaktadır. Eğer AB 
uluslararası arabuluculuk yöntem ve tekniklerini kullanmaya başlarsa sadece Kıbrıs 
sorununda değil dünya üzerindeki diğer eski geçmişe sahip etnik anlaşmazlıklarda da 
etkin bir küresel güç olarak boy gösterebilir. 
 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Kıbrıs, kayıtsız yansız üçüncül taraf, ilgili ikincil taraf, 
uluslararası arabuluculuk, müzakerecilik, AB dış politikası, AGSP, doğuya genişleme 
projesi, oybirliği 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
The following study brings a new perspective into the foreign policy 
thinking of the European Union (EU) within the particularity of its involvement 
on the island of Cyprus. In the process of becoming a political entity, the EU 
has to look for new approaches in its foreign policy making and standing in 
the world politics. The field of conflict resolution (CR) offers new policy tools 
for the EU in order to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign policy. The 
international mediation literature of the field brings alternative insights to the 
role and nature of a mediator in the protracted international conflicts. The 
Cyprus Conflict is a very old and popular case in the conflict resolution 
literature and the involvement of the EU puts the Union in the position of a 
mediator in the Cyprus Conflict. The standing of the European Union in the 
Cyprus conflict as a mediator and defining the reflections of its foreign policy 
involvement in Cyprus are the focii of this paper. 
 
This study first provides an analytical overview of the current situation 
in the Cyprus conflict. Then, a further examination defines the characteristics 
of  the European Union’s involvement in the conflict with the use of 
negotiation and international mediation literature. Furthermore this research is 
not only a critical assessment of the EU foreign policy in Cyprus but also an 
alternative projection for the EU foreign policy making in the 21’st century. 
This study proposes the European Union make more use of the international 
mediation tools so as to attain a more flexible yet assertive involvement in 
protracted ethnic conflicts.  
 
The main unit of analysis in this research is the nature and role of the 
European Union in the Cyprus conflict as a political entity. The research 
serves mainly a case study, which can be defined as both descriptive and 
explorative.  
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1.1 The Need for an Analysis of the European Union’s Foreign Policy 
Involvement in the Cyprus Conflict  
 
At the turn of this century, the European Union strives to become a 
global political entity. One of the main considerations of a global political 
entity is to build and follow a structured and effective foreign policy; however 
the European Union currently seems to lack the needed flexible foreign policy 
tools against a conflictual environment which is in itself in continuos change.  
It would not be wrong to claim that the collapse of the Soviet Union provided 
the European Community a very suitable climate to evolve into a more 
Political Union rather than a community largely built on the economic 
cooperation among its members. This fast evolution propels the Union to 
develop its own policymaking tools in this new international system. The 
1990’s gave birth to many conflicts within Europe and its periphery. The 
foreign policy of the European Union fell short to respond immediately, 
flexibly and assertively against the challenges of these new types of conflicts. 
The conflicts within the borders of the Yugoslavian Federation challenged the 
post-Maastricht European Union.  
 
The major dilemma of the EU in the pursuit of an effective foreign 
policy during the nineties was its inability to implement the principles of the 
Union into its foreign policy making. The slow, mechanic attitude of the Union, 
which operated on the bureaucratic level of dossier exchange built on a 
unanimous decision-making system, did not answer the needs of the 
conflicting parties. This discrepancy led to the fast escalation of the conflicts 
before the European Union could take any definite and immediate action. It is 
not a surprise that a political union does not possess the advantages of a 
nation state in the making and the pursuit of foreign policy, but nevertheless 
there are alternative approaches to enhance the foreign policy making 
mechanisms of the political unions.  
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For the last 15 years, the EU has become an important political 
development in the international arena. As a result of rapid evolution, the EU 
now experiences an identity dilemma about whether it is a huge bureaucracy 
or a political entity. It is possible to observe this dilemma in its foreign policy. 
The inner bureaucratic decision making mechanism of the EU seems to 
hinder it to pursue assertive and flexible policies in the management of the 
regional conflicts. Therefore the exploration of the EU’s potential and 
shortcomings in constructive conflict resolution becomes crucial.  
 
The role of the EU within the Cyprus Conflict reveals this dilemma 
clearly. The EU acts as an interested secondary party to the conflict rather 
than a neutral third party. As an interested secondary party EU follows a 
procedural accession process with the Greek part, the stronger party within 
the conflict, in the name of the whole island. The EU seems to be confident 
about the catalytic effect of the enlargement process on the settlement of the 
conflict by forcing the Turkish Cypriots into a new partnership with the South. 
Unfortunately the current attitude of the Union makes the Turkish Cypriots, 
which is the weaker primary party question the role and the nature of the EU’s 
involvement as a third party. The current mechanical accession strategy of 
the EU limits its flexibility in Cyprus and fails its foreign policy.  
 
1.2 Scope and Objective 
 
This study is conducted from a Eurasian perspective; that is both from a 
within and without a European conflict resolution perspective, so aimed as to 
explore the effective foreign policy tools from the international mediation 
literature that can be applied to the Union policy. 
 
There is multiple scope in this thesis: The primary one is the European 
Union’s involvement in the Cyprus conflict. That might be regarded as the 
main plane with sidelines drawn through the use of definitions derived from 
the international negotiation and international mediation literature. Therefore 
my two other scopes that rise vertically over this plane is the instrumentalist 
use of the international mediation and negotiation literature where possible. I 
preferred to keep the scope of my derivations for an alternative European 
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foreign policy as flexible as possible since any limitation could have 
undermined the clarity and the efficacy of the projections. 
 
The objective of the thesis can be grouped in two main bodies: 
 
(1)  To exploratively critique the European Union’s involvement in the 
Cyprus Conflict through the use of the theoretical contributions of 
negotiation and international mediation literature. This objective makes 
it possible to implement the second objective of this research study 
which is; 
 
(2) To add to  the critique a whole new body of foreign policy concepts 
which will ease and enable the flexibility of the European Union 
whenever it gets stuck into the common protracted ethnic conflicts 
within itself and its periphery. While not being modest, this objective is 
an optimistic projection for a more peaceful world and it is grounded on 
the postulate that the European Union can and should play a more 
effective role in the promotion of peace and cooperation in the region 
through the enlargement project. Such a roles which according to this 
thesis would be possible only if the EU pays more attention to the 
conflict resolution techniques and looks for ways to implement them 
effectively.  
 
1.3 Outline of The Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters. 
 
The first chapter is the introduction part of the study. After a brief introduction 
to the main problematic of the thesis, the general outline of the thesis is given 
with the main objectives and the scope of the research. 
 
The second chapter includes a general review of negotiation literature and 
international mediation literature. 
 
The critical assessment of the European Union’s involvement in Cyprus is 
held in Chapter 3. In the first part of the chapter is a listing of the EU actions 
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in Cyprus within the nineties until today. And on the second part the 
involvement of the EU is evaluated with definitions derived from the 
negotiation literature. The nature of this chapter can best be named as being 
both explorative and descriptive. 
 
On Chapter 4, the needed transformation of the enlargement project into a 
feasible framework to pursue conflict management efforts is assessed. The 
chapter discusses the possible ways to make this transformation in a swift 
fashion for the EU. 
 
Chapter 5 satisfies the second objective of this research by providing new 
foreign policy tools and concepts from the international mediation literature 
which will   enable the flexibility of the European Union whenever it gets stuck 
into the common protracted ethnic conflicts within itself and its periphery. This 
chapter is a follow-up of the critical assessment conducted in Chapter 3 and 
the enlargement framework built in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the thesis. An overall idea of the research and 
the conceptual flow of the thesis are presented in this last chapter. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter has two parts. In the first part there is a review of the past 
studies conducted on negotiation in a general perspective. And on the second 
part there is literature review on concepts and techniques of the international 
mediation. 
 
2.1 Literature Review on Negotiation 
  
According to Iklé whatever the context or the substantive issue, “two 
elements must normally be present for negotiation to take place: there must 
be both common interests and issues of conflict. Without common interests 
there is nothing to negotiate for; without conflict there is nothing to negotiate 
about” (1964:12). Negotiation occurs between the parties of the conflict; these 
parties can be grouped as primary and secondary. The primary parties are 
those who are directly related with the issues of dispute and the interested 
secondary parties include those who are not as closely effected by the 
conflict as the primary parties but are still directly been effected by the 
process of the conflict (Rubin 1989). 
 
Gulliver defines the negotiation as a problem-solving process-one in 
which people attempt to reach a joint decision on matters of common concern 
in situations where they are in disagreement (1979:xiii). According to Rubin 
the gradual shift over the last years from a focus on resolution of the conflicts 
to a focus on settlement has increased the importance of negotiation-which 
he defines as a method of settling the conflict rather than resolving it (1989). 
The focus on negotiation is not attitude change per se, but an agreement to 
change behaviour in ways to make settlement possible. Rubin claims that 
what is required for effective conflict settlement is neither cooperation nor 
competition but an “enlightened self interest”. That refers to the 
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acknowledgment by each side that the other is also likely to be pursuing a 
path of self-interest by logrolling.  
 
Analysts on international negotiation (Saunders 1985) have observed 
that some of the most important works takes place before the parties ever 
come to the table. According to Saunders it is during prenegotiation that the 
apposite parties to the conflict are identified and invited to participate, that a 
list of the issues is developed and prioritized as an agenda, and that the 
formula through which a general agreement is first outlined. But the follow-up 
and implementation of an agreement also hold a very important place for the 
success of a negotiation. In Raiffa’s “postsettlement settlement” parties who 
have already concluded an agreement are given an opportunity-with the 
assistance of a third party- to improve upon their agreement (1985). The third 
party examines the facts and figures that each side has used in reaching a 
settlement; based on this information that is kept in strict confidence the third 
party proposes a settlement that improves upon the agreement reached. 
Either side can veto this postsettlement. However, if both sides endorse the 
proposed improvement on the existing contract, than each will benefit form 
this proposal- and the third party in return is guaranteed a percentage of the 
“added value” of the contract (1985:9-12). 
  
Another useful negotiation technique offered by Rubin is to negotiate 
“from the outside in”(1989). This in other words means that the parties start 
by making extreme opening offers, then conceding step-by step until an 
agreement is reached. This method allows each negotiator to explore various 
possible agreements before settling, to obtain as much information as 
possible about the other negotiator, before closing off the discussion (Kelley 
1966). But this traditional method ignores a very important and creative 
alternative: working “from the inside out”. According to Fisher and Ury to work 
at the level of interests rather than positions is the key to this approach 
(1981). The parties start with an exchange of views about underlying needs 
and interests and build an agreement on what both parties find acceptable. 
Fisher offers the use of “one-text” negotiation procedure for convenience, 
whereby a mediator develops a single negotiating text that is criticised and 
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improved by each side until a final draft is developed for approval by the 
interested parties (1981). 
  
The scholars of the field have examined the negotiation structure in 
different ways. The simplest model of negotiation is symmetry. There is a 
basic symmetry in any negotiator in that both parties have the veto power. 
This condition provides the situation of power equality as the most favourable 
condition for satisfactory negotiations (Rubin & Brown 1975). According to 
Zartman a stalemate born out of a double veto defines a situation that 
requires negotiation and negotiation is usually not possible until both sides 
recognise this stalemate (1982,1989). Some other scholars choose to define 
this power equality in a more dynamic translation as reciprocity, as a 
responsive taking of concessions for a convergent outcome (Bartos 1978; 
Larson, 1988; Khury 1968). Reciprocity is the result of two parties of equal 
power trying to get the most they can out of a negotiation. Parties who make 
the early concessions expect to be repaid at the end or else that would cause 
of a feeling of trickery and fall of a possible agreement (Jensen 1987; 
Hopmann 1978; Whelan 1988). According to 1986 study of Lax and Sebenius 
on the Negotiator’s Dilemma they found out that the tougher a negotiator, the 
greater her chance of getting an agreement close to her position but the less 
her chance of getting an agreement at all; whereas the weaker the negotiator, 
the greater the chance of getting an agreement but the less his chance of 
getting an agreement close to his position.  
 
Parties negotiate most productively when they feel equal, and they 
achieve the most satisfactory outcome when they view the process as fair. 
The structural equality allows parties to focus on creation of larger benefits for 
equalised outcomes (Axelrod 1970; Zartman 1982). Zartman defines the 
symmetry as both the goal and the assumption of a successful, creative 
negotiation.  
  
 The basic difference between the negotiation and mediation is that in a 
negotiation there are primary parties and interested secondary parties to the 
conflict. But in the context of mediation a third party is involved. A mediation 
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system comprises the parties of the conflict (primary and secondary), a 
mediator, a process of mediation and the context of mediation. The 
interaction among these elements determines the nature, quality and 
effectiveness of any form of mediation (Bercovitch 1992). 
 
2.2 Literature Review on International Mediation 
  
International mediation has a long history of practice. However the 
systemic study of the topic occurred in the past three decades beginning with 
Young (1967), Burton (1969), and Stenelo (1972). But the issue of 
international mediation became an important topic after the end of the cold 
war in the field of International Relations due to its refreshed visibility in that 
era (Kleiboer 1998). According to Bercovitch mediation occurs as a form of 
international conflict management when: “ (1) a conflict has gone on for some 
time, (2) the efforts of the individuals or actors have reached an impasse, (3) 
neither actor is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the 
dispute, and (4) both parties welcome some form of mediation and are ready 
to engage in direct or indirect dialogue” (1984). It is salient that Bercovitch 
uses similar meanings to those of Zartman when he defines the act of 
mediation. Mediation is introduced in the case of a Hurting Stalemate in 
William Zartman’s terms; that is when the conflicting parties are neither 
capable of managing the conflict through a clear victory on the field, or some 
kind of a negotiated solution, nor willing to accept any imposed solution by a 
third party decision-making (1985). Mediation thus can be defined as a 
political process with no advance commitment from the parties to accept the 
mediator’s ideas (Zartman & Touval 1996).  
 
The scope of the international mediation is very large. Doob defines 
international mediation as “ the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or 
more other persons when the former, the latter or both perceive a problem 
requiring a resolution”(1993:1). Mitchell on the other side defines it as “an 
intermediary activity undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of 
achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the 
parties, or at least ending disruptive behaviour” (1987:287). Folberg and 
Taylor characterise mediation as “the process which the participants, together 
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with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate 
disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach 
a unanimous settlement that will accommodate their needs” (1984:7). The 
renowned scholars of the field of Conflict Resolution like Bercovitch (1981), 
Wall (1981) and Dryzek and Hunter (1987) see international mediation as “a 
reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance 
of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organisation to 
change their behaviour, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without 
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law” (Bercovitch 
1996:13). 
 
According to Webb the act of mediation is not a neutral act; it is a moral 
and political act undertaken by the mediator to achieve desired ends. The 
mediator may claim to be neutral with respect to the values and claims of the 
adversaries, but the act of mediation with regard to Webb is still a declaration 
of the values held by the mediator (1988). The perceived role of the mediator 
by the disputant is of severe importance for the success of the mediation. 
There are different perspectives about the mediator’s role in the Conflict 
Resolution literature. Kressel in 1972 defined a typology to categorize 
mediator behaviour ranging from passive to assertive in three strategies: (1) 
reflective behavior, (2) nondirective behaviour, and (3) directive behaviour. 
The reflective strategy is the most passive category. Mediator acting in this 
category aims to reduce the degree of complexity and uncertainty in the 
conflict, by providing knowledge and information about the conflicting issues 
and parties. According to Bercovitch the mediator strives to “ achieve some 
convergence of expectations by reducing distortion, ignorance, 
misperception, or unrealistic intentions” (1984:98). Nondirective behaviour is 
a more proactive involvement in which the conflicting parties will arrive at a 
mutually acceptable solution with a minimum help from the mediator. In this 
category mediator can control publicity of the conflict management 
environment (by providing a neutral place for the mediation) and the 
resources (the number and the identity of the parties) to affect the structure of 
the mediation. Ultimately in the directive behaviour the mediator takes an 
active role to encourage a specific solution or seeks to manipulate the parties 
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directly into ending the dispute. Mediator offers proposals or 
recommendations and exerts direct pressure. 
 
Rubin introduced a comprehensive set of dichotomous mediator roles 
like formal vs. informal, impartial vs.partial, individual vs. collective, conflict 
managing vs. conflict escalating, content oriented vs. process oriented 
(1981). Zartman and Touval on the other hand clustered the mediator roles in 
three main definitions. The mediator can act either as a communicator, a 
formulator, or a manipulator. As a communicator mediator can be regarded 
as only a catalyst, without putting any part of its character in the process but 
only providing an open pipeline between the parties where none was possible 
before. As a formulator  the mediator adds his own ideas and perceptions of a 
positive outcome when there is none. As a manipulator he adds not only his 
ideas but also his own power to move the parties toward an agreement and 
his own resources to make up an outcome with a sum positive to attract both 
parties’ agreement (1985).  
  
Zartman coming from the realist paradigm defines the roles of the 
mediator in terms of its nature like states, small or middle powers and 
international organizations (1996). And all of these mediator roles naturally 
have different motives. But perhaps the most comprehensive approach in the 
study of mediation is the contingency model of mediation used by Bercovitch 
for several times (1986,1991,1993). Bercovitch forms three clusters for the 
model: context, process and outcome variables. Each cluster refers to the 
characteristics of the party, the dispute, the mediator and the outcome (1996). 
He focuses on the reciprocal relationship between these elements, which I 
would also use to analyse the role and nature of the mediator in this study.  
 
The main responsibility of the mediator is therefore to assist the disputants 
to find a solution, which they are not able to find by themselves. For the 
success of mediation all of the parties should cooperate fully with the 
mediator. Mediation aims to provide a positive-sum solution unlike the 
traditional competitive adversarial relations that end up with a zero-sum 
agreement (Bercovitch 1996). Mediation seems as a “reciprocal process of 
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social interaction in which the mediator is a major participant”(Bercovitch & 
Houston 1996). 
 
One other important aspect in the success of mediation is the parties’ 
motivations in accepting a mediator. Zartman and Touval list four general 
motives which follows as; the expectation that the value of the mediation 
outcome will go beyond any gain from the conflict, the hope that mediation 
will bring a settlement otherwise impossible through direct negotiations, the 
expectation that the mediator will decrease the costs and risks of the 
concession making while showing it as a compromise and a belief of the 
parties that the involvement of the mediator guarantees a final agreement 
(1996).  
 
An empirical analysis conducted by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 
on the relation between mediator strategies and mediation success 
concluded that: “(1) more active mediation strategies are more effective in 
international mediation, and (2) active mediation strategies can affect and be 
responsive to a wider variety of dispute situations than less active strategies” 
(1991:16). Kochan on the contrary claims that a premature use of active 
strategies is not without risks; it may ruin the mediator’s credibility and 
acceptability. According to him when the conditions are not ripe for settlement 
a mediator should withhold aggressive tactics; when conditions turnout to be 
ripe, on the other hand, a peaceful settlement would not be possible without 
such tactics (1981:26). Zartman also emphasises the role of timing and power 
in mediation. Power is defined as the ability to move a party in an intended 
direction or leverage. Zartman and Touval outlines five derivations of 
leverage; persuasion, extraction, termination, deprivation and gratification 
(1996). To use the right type of leverage in the right time is very 
consequential in conducting mediation. Right timing means the right moment 
and right mode of entry of a mediator into the conflict. Issue of ripeness or the 
ripe moment to act holds a key place among the scholars of the field. 
Zartman has developed the concepts of hurting stalemate, imminent mutual 
catastrophe and entrapment (1985) within the issue of ripeness while Chris 
Mitchell developed enticing-opportunity model suggesting that any change in 
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the environment of conflict may provide an escape tunnel, a more positive 
expectation from the future for the parties than the anticipated costs of 
continuing the conflict; hence creating a motivation to change aggressive 
behaviour ( 1995). So this again brings us back the issue that the effects of 
the mediation role is arbitrated by the context of the conflict. 
 
The use of international mediation techniques has become a common 
foreign policy tool after the cold war. It provides an alternative flexible 
technique to the foreign policy making of the political entities in the 21’st 
century. In 1995 Boutros Boutros Gali, president of the UN at that time, 
defined the principal aim of the international mediation as the creation of 
structures for the creation of peace. The post cold war international system 
may contain incentives for subnational groups to press secessionist aims; 
recognition of the constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia is a 
demonstration of the partition of the existing states as a high possibility. 
Revision of existing norms and the development of new norms by 
international organisations is a critical aspect of appropriately structuring 
incentives to promote intergroup cooperation. Donald Horowitz puts the 
ethnic conflict as a major reason for the failure of democratisation in many 
countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and the Former Soviet Union (1993:18). Sisk 
sees intervention to promote power sharing as an act of mediation, involving 
helping parties to analyse the nature of their conflicts, introducing formulas 
and options, wielding sticks and offering carrots to induce parties to accept 
solutions believed to be appropriate (1997:94). For example after the NATO 
bombing of Bosnian Serbs has clearly influenced the process by which a 
confederal power-sharing arrangement was reached in the Bosnian War in 
the November 1995 Dayton Accords.  
 
The use of power in the international mediation has always been a 
supplement to the use of flexible diplomatic tools designed to empower the 
mediator’s capabilities. For example in October 1992 the UN representative 
Cyrus Vance and EU Representative Lord Owen came up with a plan to 
establish peace in Bosnia Hersegovina but since the mediators lacked the 
enough power leverage to implement, the plan did not work out for good and 
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failed. But the being a political union it was evident that the European Union 
lacked the flexibility and the power leverage to implement the peace plan. But 
on the other hand the USA had managed to implement a multi layer 
mediation technique with an effective and flexible diplomatic maneaveurs of 
Holbrooke empowered by the ongoing NATO bombardment of the Bosnian 
Serb armaments in the region. It was a fact that the European Union could 
not manage a conflict within its borders and needed the assistance of a state 
for efficacy.  
 
The European Union and the world system have undergone some 
changes since the time of the Bosnian conflict. The eastern enlargement 
project is one of those changes. The promises of prosperity, stability and 
security poses the European Union as a point of attraction for the central and 
eastern European countries and the involvement of these countries as future 
members of the Union largely depends on the Union’s decision on taking the 
Greek Cypriot administration into the Union. The unanimous decision-making 
structure of the EU is the key factor.   
 
The foreign policy involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus 
conflict is being evaluated in the next chapter within the last decade. The 
evaluation of the involvement is structured upon how the candidacy of the 
Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration) developed to be the main 
denominator on the EU policy towards the Cyprus conflict. The analysis aims 
to define the Union policy in the conflict through the use of a chronological 
division of the European Union position from the start of the nineties into 
certain periods of continuous growth of policy involvement coupled with a 
deepening reliance on the accession negotiations as the sole foreign policy 
instrument. 
 
This work claims that the role of the EU in the Cyprus problem is that 
of a negotiator rather than that of a mediator. The position of the European 
Union in the Cyprus conflict has changed from a disinterested third party to 
an interested secondary party position. Therefore the European Union can 
only use the policy tools of a negotiator.  
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The next chapter examines this shift of the EU position in the Cyprus 
conflict within the last decade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: A SUMMARY OF THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN CYPRUS 
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 This chapter evaluates the European Union’s involvement in the 
Cyprus Conflict through the use of definitions derived from the negotiation 
literature. The involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus conflict is 
defined by the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots in the name of 
the whole island. The analysis overs the period between the beginning of the 
nineties and present. Then an explorative analysis of the contradictions in the 
EU foreign policy is given in the Cyprus conflict. 
 
3.1. The EU’s Accession Negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus (The 
Greek Cypriots) 
 
 It is possible to group the EC/EU negotiations with Cyprus in four 
phases. In each of these phases the EC/EU has followed different policies in 
its relations with Cyprus. The first phase is the period between 1990 and 
1994; the timeline between the application of the Greek Cypriots to EC in 
July, 1990 and the EU summit at Corfu in July, 1994 when the EU has 
announced it would involve Cyprus in the next round of its enlargement. The 
second phase is the term between the end of 1994 and July 1997 summit that 
set the Agenda2000. The third phase is the period between July 1997 and 
December 1999 EU summit at Helsinki.  The fourth phase covers the 
involvement of the EU between the Helsinki summit until the bi-communal 
talks in 2002. 
 
During these phases of the stance of the European Union has 
gradually shifted from a disinterested third party position to that of an 
interested secondary party. As has previously been defined in Chapter 2, the 
EU, by adopting a secondary party status in the conflict is compelled to 
pursue limited conflict settlement policies of a negotiator. In the assessment 
parts of the phases the unanimous decision making system of the Union is 
presented as the determinant of these changes in EU policies.  The rule 
of unanimity has been decisive in the EU’s positional shift in the conflict.  
Without the consent of a member the union policies will not be realised. 
Therefore it can be inferred that the Greek policy of threatening by veto the 
eastern enlargement of the European Union without the RoC as a future 
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member has proved effective in shaping up the EU policy towards the Cyprus 
conflict. 
 
3.1.1. The First Phase (July, 1990 - June, 1994) 
 
 On July 4, 1990 the application of the Greek Cypriots in the name of 
Republic of Cyprus to the European Communities (EC) was presented to the 
Foreign Minister of Italy, the then President of the Council. The Council 
accepted the application and sent it for consideration by the Commission on 
September 17, 1990. The Commission, in its Opinion on the application 
issued on June 30, 19931 and endorsed by the Council on October 17 of the 
same year, considered Cyprus eligible for membership and, in expectation of 
progress on the political problem, confirmed that the Community was ready to 
start the process with Cyprus that should lead to its eventual accession. The 
European Council Summits at Corfu in June 1994 and Essen in December 
1994 confirmed that the next round of the European Union’s enlargement 
would involve Cyprus and Malta. 
 
 The issue of the membership and a possible settlement of the Cyprus 
conflict were closely linked to each other as far as the parties were 
concerned. During the first phase of the 1990’s, the EC/EU chose to distance 
itself from the settlement efforts, leaving those to be conducted under the 
aegis of the UN (Jakobsson-Hatay, 2001). However  the Community had to 
make certain decisions. The first of these decisions was whether or not to 
accept the application made by the Greek part on behalf of the whole island. 
The legitimacy of the application was already questioned by the TRNC on the 
grounds that the de facto Greek government does not represent the Republic 
of Cyprus.2  
                                                          
1 The concluding section of the European Commission’s opinion paper about the Republic of 
Cyprus’ application to EEC (June 30, 1993): “ Cyprus’ geographical position, deep lying 
bonds which, for 2000 years have located the island at the very found of European culture 
and civilization, the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by 
people of Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, social and economic life of its 
citizens, wealth of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus, 
beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirms vocation to belong to the 
Community.” 
2 According to Turkish Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus is dead since it did not operate on 
the terms settled in the partnership agreement in 1959 Zurich, which established the 
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 The application of the Greek Cypriots to the European Union in 1990 is 
one of the strategic moves shifting the stance of the European Community at 
that time. The timing of the application came at a very critical time when the 
UN sponsored intercommunal talks have failed. RoC saw the failure of the 
negotiations as an opportunity to include the European platform in the agenda 
of the conflict. According to RoC the European Community offered an 
alternative dimension of pressure for the settlement of the conflict to be 
exerted on the Turkey and indirectly on the TRNC (Republic of Cyprus Press 
and Information Office, 1997)3. And three years later, on 30 June 1993, the 
European Commission has announced its Opinion on the Greek Cypriot 
application stating the eligibility of the Republic of Cyprus to EU membership. 
The Opinion suggested that: 
 “Cyprus’ integration with the Community 
implies a peaceful, balanced and a lasting 
settlement of the Cyprus conflict- a settlement that 
will make it possible for the two communities to be 
reconciled, for confidence to be re-established and 
for their respective leaders to work together.”4  
 
In the Opinion on Cyprus the European Commission saw the 
settlement of the conflict as a precondition for the start of the accession 
negotiations.5 
 
The Commission in its Opinion of June 1993, although admitting that 
the application of the Greek Cypriots was questioned by the ‘de-facto’ Turkish 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Republic of Cyprus. In the 1960 Constitution the Turkish Cypriots had a right to veto in 
foreign policy issues “except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international 
organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate” (Basic 
structure of the Republic of Cyprus, Article VIII). The constitution also prevented the Republic 
of Cyprus from joining any political or economic union with any other state (Treaty of 
Guarantee, Article I) or engage in any activity aimed at promoting either union with any other 
state or partition of the island (Treaty of Guarantee, Article II). The Turkish Republic of North 
Cyprus translates these articles as also preventing a possible membership of the Greek 
Cypriots in the EU, which according to the Turkish Cypriot perspective would indirectly mean 
union with the motherland Greece.  
3 George Vassillou, the president of the Greek Cypriots at that time who is, now also the chief 
negotiator with the EU, chose to follow a policy of internationalisation of the Cyprus conflict. 
In refusing to meet with Denktaş, the president of the Turkish Cypriots Vasillou demanded to 
meet with Turgut Özal, the then Prime Minister of Turkey. However his request was 
demurred (Bölükbaşı 1995;Richmond 1998). 
4 Opinion, para.47 
5 Ibid., para.48 
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government in the northern part of the island, did not put any reservation on 
the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriots’ application on behalf of the whole island. 
The European Commission considered the Greek part as eligible for 
membership. On the other hand, the Commission put some reservations with 
reference to the initiation of the accession negotiations; by saying the 
accession negotiations would start “as soon as the prospect of a settlement is 
surer” (Commission of the European Communities, 1993). This attitude of the 
European Community would soon have changed with the introduction of the 
European Union into the international arena and the new perspective on the 
enlargement of the European Union. At this point, the EC/EU, although 
appreciating the future membership of the island of Cyprus, still regarded the 
positions of the primary parties as an essential part of the EU process. The 
European Commission even set a date to reconsider the question of the 
accession of Cyprus in January 1995. This has set a sensible schedule for 
the Cypriot negotiations. 
  
Nonetheless the European Council did not follow the Commission’s 
Opinion on Cyprus6 and without any more talks taking place between the two 
communities, the Council welcomed the application of the Greek Cypriots in 
the Corfu Summit on June 1994, for accession into the European Union and 
wanted to speed up the negotiations envisioning that ‘ the next enlargement 
of the Union will involve Cyprus and Malta’.7 
 
 Assessment of the First Phase (July, 1990 - June, 1994) 
In this phase disinterested neutral third party position the EC/EU was 
the result of a policy that considered the possible accession of the island of 
Cyprus into the EU closely related to the settlement of the conflict. The same 
period also witnessed the transition of the European Community into the 
European Union, and therefore the need for the creation of a common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) for an increasingly political union. The main axis 
of the new foreign policy of the European Union after the Maastricht Treaty 
                                                          
6 European Commission is an advisory body, therefore the opinions of the Commission is not binding 
on the European Council decisions.  
7 European Council at Corfu, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, June 24-25,1994. 
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turned out to be the enlargement of the Union towards East and South. The 
inclusion of ex-communist countries of the Eastern and Central European 
countries became the primary preference of the EU. Greece as a member of 
the European Union foresaw this newly forming preference as an opportunity 
to push the Union into the Cyprus Conflict by putting the eastern enlargement 
project as a conflict settlement tool that would force the weaker primary party 
yield in favour of the stronger one.  
 
In this period the EC/EU chose to follow a neutral policy of staying 
away. towards the settlement efforts of the Cyprus Conflict run by the United 
Nations. It supported the efforts of the UN and saw the possible settlement of 
the conflict as a positive effect for the enlargement project of the European 
Union. The proviso of looking forward to a solution respecting  ‘The 
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country in 
accordance with the relevant UN and high-level agreements’ was a prominent 
statement of the European Union during that period. The EU position can be 
named as a disinterested neutral third party with no interest of becoming a 
mediator for the settlement of the conflict.   
 
The disinterested neutral third party position of the European Union 
was a follow up of the same policy since the Turkish intervention of 1974 
(See Figure3.1). At that time the newly formed procedure of the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign policy failed its first blue-print test on 
the issue since they chose to leave the matter to the United Nations Security 
Council or to choose to expect an agreement between the islanders in talks 
arranged by the representative of the UN Secretary General (Brewin, 1999).   
 
The pursuit of such a disinterested, reluctant third party policy might be 
explained with reference to the existence of a bipolar international system at 
that time. With the beginning of the nineties and the dissolution of the bipolar 
system the European Community, the European Union was then pushed to 
be a more politically active union. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) came into being with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. One of the main 
objectives of the CFSP is ‘to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as 
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well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris 
Charter, including those on external borders’.8  Such a politically ambitious 
projection presupposes more active foreign policy involvement from the EU. 
During the first phase, restructuring the EC into the EU could have led the 
Union to attain an interested third party position in the conflict that sought to 
implement mediation activities. As explained in assessment of the second 
phase, the Union gradually became interested in the Cyprus conflict not in the 
sense of a neutral third party but as a secondary party. Nevertheless at the 
beginning of the restructuring period the position of the community was still 
that of a disinterested third party. In the conclusion of the 1993 Opinion, the 
European Commission announced ‘that the situation should be reassessed in 
view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks’.  The position of the 
European Union at this point regarding the two parties appeared fair and 
neutral.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3.1 The disinterested third party position of the EU with a neutral 
distance to the primary parties of the conflict 
                                                          
8 There are four other fundamental objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the European Union as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. These objectives 
were then slightly modified by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. The other four objectives is as 
follows;  
 To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter; 
 To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 
 To promote international cooperation; 
 To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
ROC TRNC
EU 
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3.1.2. The Second Phase (June, 1994 - July, 1997) 
In the Corfu Summit, the European Council announced that Cyprus9 and 
Malta would be involved in the next phase of enlargement of the European Union. 
This was the first time that the necessity of a settlement of the conflict and the 
accession process were separated. Conclusions reached at the summit did not refer to 
the need for a settlement before the accession takes place (European Council, 1994). 
The position of the EU became more apparent as the ruling of the European Court of 
Justice in July 1994 against the import of Turkish Cypriot potatoes and citrus fruit 
without Roc health and transport certificates (Tocci 2001).10  
 
On August 1994 the TRNC assembly revoked all past commitments to 
a federal solution that it has put forward during the negotiations. With the 
Essen Summit on December 1994 the European Council reiterated the Corfu 
decision in favour of the initiation of talks with the RoC.  
 
 On March 6, 1995, the General Affairs Council Conclusion confirmed 
the RoC’s suitability for membership and established that the accession 
negotiations with RoC would start six months after the conclusion of the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC): 
The Council of Ministers.... reaffirms the suitability of 
Cyprus for accession to the European Union and 
confirms the European Union’s will to incorporate 
Cyprus in the next stage of its development. 11 
 
On June 1995 the EC-Cyprus Association Council adopted a common 
resolution on the establishment of a structured dialogue between the EU and 
                                                          
9 In the EU documents the Republic of Cyprus is named as “Cyprus”, a term open to 
speculations whether the union deliberately refrains from pronouncing an opinion on the 
relationship between today’s RoC and a future unified state of Cyprus, which is an issue of 
conflict itself. According to Greek Cypriots a future unified Cyprus should be a successor of 
the Republic of Cyprus whereas the Turkish Cypriots claim a totally new partnership for the 
future, different from that of 1960 republic (Jakobsson-Hatay 2001). 
10 With this ruling of the European Court of Justice the Turkish Cypriots became economically 
more isolated and began to seek a closer cooperation with Turkey. 
11 The decision of the Council was the result of a ‘compromise’ through which Greece was 
forced to lift its veto against the signing of the Custom’s Union agreement with Turkey. 
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the RoC and on certain elements to establish the strategy to prepare for the 
accession. The Association Council added that RoC’s membership in the 
Union was aimed to bring benefits to both communities on the island and 
contribute to peace and conciliation. As a reaction the TRNC leadership 
introduced preconditions to direct negotiations. Direct negotiations would only 
be resumed if conducted on a state-to-state basis. Following the March 1995 
decision, Turkey and TRNC declared their intention of partial integration in 
December 1995.  
 
The Joint Declaration was signed in January 199712. On July 1997, 
Agenda 2000 has set the guidelines for the future of the European Union in 
the new century. The Agenda 2000 decision considered the start of the 
accession negotiations with a divided Cyprus. As a response to the decision, 
president of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş blocked the ongoing talks in Glion and 
demanded an immediate halt to the accession negotiations between the RoC 
and the EU. 
 
 Assessment of the Second Phase (June, 1994 - July, 1997) 
 
The membership of South Cyprus holds the key in the European 
Union’s eastern enlargement project of the as the result of the unanimous 
decision-making system. The detached third party position of the European 
Community towards the Cyprus conflict had to be replaced with a one-sided 
perspective by the European Union in favour of the Greek part. The newly 
structuring EU did not want to see any obstacle against the realisation of the 
enlargement project. The expected change came at the June 1994 Summit of 
the European Council at Corfu. 
 
The core building block of the EU foreign policy making is its eastern 
enlargement project which best can be described as aimed to bring stability 
and security onto the region under the umbrella of the European Union. With 
such growing political aims, the European Union was not expected to remain 
detached from the settlement efforts of the conflict. The position of the Union 
                                                          
12 The Joint Declaration signed between Turkey and TRNC in January 1997 included 
economic and financial integration and partial foreign, defence and security policy integration. 
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with the application of the Greek Cypriots was altered and the internal policy 
making structure became apparently decisive in the pursuit of its policies 
towards Cyprus. The principle of unanimity is the general rule in the 
European Union and the accession treaties of the candidate countries must 
be ratified unanimously by the parliaments of the member countries. 
Therefore, when evaluating the underlying logic of the EU policies towards 
Cyprus, this general principle should always be kept into consideration. 
 
In June 1994 with the Corfu decision, the European Union has for the 
first time shown its determination to involve Cyprus in the next phase of 
enlargement without putting the settlement of the conflict as a precondition for 
the start of the accession negotiations. That has meant the removal of 
conditionality for the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots. The European 
Union exchanged the stick with the carrot as a result of the Greek threat to 
the expansion of the Union to the CEE (Central and Eastern European) 
countries.  
 
During this period the stance of the EU was getting clearer, the Union 
while preferring to keep a safe distance from the conflict chose to move 
closer to the Greek Cypriot Administration. The position of the Union shifted 
from a disinterested third party position to an interested secondary party 
position behind the Greek Cypriot stance (See Figure3.2). 
 
The higher level goals of the Union like the enlargement and 
deepening urged the EU to keep the integrity among its members and pushed 
the Union to a more sided position in the Cyprus conflict. Greece as a 
member of the Union has played its part correctly by threatening the 
expansion to the CEE countries through the rule of unanimity in the decision-
making of the EU. The European Union in the second phase lost its chance to 
do active mediation and became captive of its internal decision making 
system by indirectly presenting itself as an interested secondary party to the 
conflict. The EU without even trying to become a mediator became a party to 
negotiate for a favourable settlement of the conflict.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 ROC
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Figure3.2 The interested secondary party position of the EU 
 
In the third phase, the EU has started to use the accession 
negotiations with South Cyprus as a channel to conduct its foreign policy in 
the Cyprus conflict, but this newly forming policy had a limited place to make 
flexible moves as soon to be discovered. Continuos imposition of sticks on 
North in the form of trade embargo and non-recognition while offering a place 
to the Greek Cypriots in the European Union without putting the settlement of 
the conflict as a condition as carrots did not make any positive effect for the 
negotiations. The involvement of the European Union built on the accession 
negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus had limited space for manoeuvre. 
 
3.1.3 The Third Phase (July, 1997- December, 1999) 
 
 1997 was an important year for the Cyprus Conflict in regard to the EU 
Accession process. In the summer of 1997, the UN sponsored peace talks 
crippled on the issue of the EU when the European Commission in its 
communication to the European Parliament and to the European Council on 
the future development of the Union, Agenda 2000; recommended the 
initiation of accession negotiations with Cyprus even in the absence of 
progress. The Agenda 2000 communicated that the prospect of accession 
could in itself provide an incentive for peace in the island. Agenda 2000 made 
it clear that if a settlement was not reached before the EU accession 
negotiations were due to begin, they should be opened with the Greek 
Cypriots, the so-called “Republic of Cyprus” , as the only internationally 
recognized authority in the island. 
 
EU 
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After the announcement of Agenda 2000, the Greek Cypriots refused 
to discuss the issues related to EU within the ongoing UN talks by claiming 
the issue as “governmental” (Pillai, 1999). The Turkish Cypriots responded by 
withdrawing from the UN negotiations and demanding the recognition of 
TRNC by the international community and suspension of the EU accession 
talks with the Greek Cypriots. The final blow to the peace process came with 
the December 1997 Luxembourg Council Summit at which a date was given 
to the Greek Cypriots to begin the accession negotiations with the EU 
whereas Turkey was turned down in its sought for the candidate status. 
Turkey decided to freeze its political dialogue with the EU capital, Brussels13 
and began to take several steps towards building economic integration 
between Turkey and the TRNC as a response to the developing integration 
between RoC and the EU (Jakobsson-Hatay, 2001). When the accession 
negotiations were initiated in March 1998 between the Greek Cypriots and 
the EU, Turkey established a joint economic zone with the TRNC.  On April 
23, 1998 Turkey and TRNC jointly declared inter alia: 
 
The EU has disregarded international law and the 1959-
1960 Agreements on Cyprus by deciding to open 
negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration of 
Southern Cyprus, and has dealt a blow to the efforts for 
a solution. Currently, any negotiation process aimed at 
finding a solution to the Cyprus question can have a 
chance of success only if it is conducted between two 
sovereign equals.14  
 
Assessment of the Third Phase (July 1997- December 1999) 
 
In this phase, the European Union has become conscious of its 
policies towards the Cyprus Conflict. Before this period, the EU approached 
the conflict through the enlargement project but did not seem to notice the 
effect of its policies on the settlement efforts of the conflict. The schedule until 
the Helsinki summit became the period in which the EU has come to realise 
the possible catalytic effect of the accession negotiations with the South 
                                                          
13 Although Turkey has frozen its political dialogue with Brussels, the relations on other areas of 
cooperation continued like in the example of the Customs Union (CU).  
14 Anadolu Agency, April 24, 1998. 
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Cyprus on the conflict. In other words, as an interested secondary party, the 
EU has seen that it can use the accession negotiations with one of the 
primary parties of the conflict, the Greek Cypriots, to manipulate its relations 
with the other primary part, the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
Agenda 2000 recommended the initiation of accession negotiations, 
even in the absence of any progress in the settlement efforts of the conflict 
though hoping that the EU factor would make a positive effect on the conflict. 
The two-sided tone of EU agenda showed the reflection of the Union's 
internal dilemma on decision-making in its foreign policy making in the Cyprus 
conflict. Although the Union has certain aims to be an influential actor in the 
international politics, the reality is that the EU also has to seek harmony 
within the Union to continue with its enlargement project.  
 
As the Union’s aim of enlargement materialized, the hidden dilemma in 
the foreign policy making of the Union in the Cyprus conflict became more 
apparent. The EU now deliberately announced that it gave primary 
importance to its enlargement process and was ready to handle the failure of 
the settlement efforts considering one of its most promising prospective 
members. The Greek blackmail of veto on the enlargement was not a small 
thing to risk; therefore, the foreign policy making in the Union level had to be 
fashioned in a way to satisfy the security needs of one of its member states.  
 
One of the most interesting aspects of this period was that the 
European Union has used accession negotiations with Republic of Cyprus as 
a means to preserve the balance within the Union regarding the enlargement 
project by satisfying Greece. During that period, the EU developed its 
relations with the Greek Cypriots as an interested secondary party to the 
conflict. As a result of the necessity to keep the unanimity in the decision-
making procedure for the continuation of the eastern enlargement project, the 
accession negotiations became the only conflict resolution tool of the Union. 
Starting from 1997 until present the EU as an interested secondary party to 
the conflict tried to manipulate the relations between the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots by using the accession negotiations (See Figure3.3). The Union tried 
to act as an assertive third party but the unanimous decision-making structure 
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of the European Union did not leave too much of a space for the Union to 
attain an assertive yet neutral third party position in Cyprus. 
 
Therefore, the European Council did not have too many choices when 
it announced a date for the initiation of the accession talks with the Republic 
of Cyprus in the Luxembourg summit in December 1997. Turkey was denied 
the status of a candidate country in the summit. It can be inferred that with the 
Luxembourg summit the European Union’ Cyprus policy coincided with the 
enlargement project of the Union. The Republic of Cyprus would soon start 
the accession negotiation within three months without any precondition set for 
the settlement of the conflict before the EU negotiations begin. For the 
coming 1.5 years the EU went on with the accession negotiations with the 
Greek Cypriots as it was scheduled. The Turkish Cypriots first struck by an 
EU embargo on the export of citrus fruits and then by a financial crisis in mid-
1997 went through economic destabilisation and relative economic 
deprivation along with a speeding integration with Turkey. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3.3 EU as an interested secondary party uses the accession negotiations to 
manipulate the relations among the primary parties 
 
 
3.1.4 The Fourth Phase (December, 1999-Present) 
 
 The Helsinki Summit in December 1999, was a turning point in the EU-
Cyprus relations.  The summit had an important connotation regarding the 
Cyprus Conflict. The clause saying that the Republic of Cyprus is a future 
member of the European Union confirmed the European Union policy of de-
ROC TRNC
EU 
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linking membership and the requirements for a settlement of the conflict. With 
this clause, the European Union officially declared that it is not a neutral third 
party and has no intention of doing any mediation work in the Cyprus conflict. 
As an interested secondary party, the relational interest of the Union is with 
only one of the primary parties, the Greek Cypriots. Thus the accession 
negotiations are intended to be kept without the conflict process by the EU.  
 
The conclusions stopped short but still they declared the willingness of 
the Union to accept the Southern Cyprus without a settlement in the conflict 
(Jakobsson-Hatay, 2001). The statement of the council regarding the issue 
was as follows:  
If no settlement has been reached by the completion of 
the accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on 
accession will be made without the above being a 
precondition. In this Council will take account of all the 
relevant factors (European Council Helsinki Declaration, 
1999).   
 
Following the Helsinki European Council decision, the European Union 
did not put the settlement of the Cyprus Conflict as an explicit condition for 
Turkey’s entry into the EU. Nevertheless, the Accession Partnership 
Document drawn up by the Commission in November 2000 it is stated that 
Turkey should support strongly in the context of political dialogue the UN 
Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process of finding a settlement for the 
Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion.  
 
 While the Republic of Cyprus had been making rapid progress in the 
accession negotiations, the conflict settlement efforts did not move forward. 
The proximity talks under the observation of the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan aimed to restart the negotiations between the two communities failed 
during 2000. Until the initiation of the talks between the two communities in 
December 2001, the conflict seemed to reach a no solution with the 
upcoming final decision whether to include the Greek Cypriots into EU or not.  
 
Assessment of the Fourth Phase (December 1999- Present) 
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The decisions laid out in the Helsinki summit show that the European 
Council tried to create a new platform with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. 
Candidacy status given to Turkey as a gesture to restart the halted 
communication provided a new platform to operate on the EU-Turkey 
relations, whereas the statement regarding the Cyprus conflict and the 
accession of RoC into the Union have been presented as the vital subjects of 
this new platform. With the Helsinki summit, the European Union promised 
conditional membership15 to Turkey in an unforeseeable future and offered a 
space to communicate ways to enhance the relationship. New efforts on the 
settlement of the Cyprus conflict was shown as one of the most important 
channels to rebuild trust among Turkey and the EU.  
 
The intention of the EU was to put pressure on Turkey to restart the 
peace negotiations with the South since Turkey is perceived as the other 
interested secondary party in the Cyprus conflict. The tone of the EU has 
observably gotten louder as the time to close the accession negotiations with 
the RoC grew near. The open-ended statement in the Helsinki Summit 
conclusions both showed the willingness and determination of the EU to see 
the RoC as its future member as well as the reluctance of accepting a 
divided, war torn country into the Union with an unresolved conflict for more 
than over a 30 years.  
 
As noted above, the European Union is a secondary party to the 
conflict and preferring to follow competitive negotiation strategies with the 
other primary party (TRNC) and the secondary party (Turkey). Relations built 
between the EU and TRNC and Turkey are similar to those between parties 
in a multilateral negotiation context. The EU forms a covered coalition with 
the RoC as the preferred primary party, against the coalition of Turkey and 
TRNC. The negotiation tactics that the EU follow are those of a competitive 
negotiator. The European Union ignores the demands and requests of the 
Turkish Cypriots, such as the recognition by the international community or 
                                                          
15 Turkey has to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria that still stand as the biggest obstacle to start 
accession negotiations with the EU.  
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the removal of the trade embargo on North Cyprus. The European Union, 
when asked to attain a more pro-active stance in the conflict process, 
demands discussion of its own agenda items, such as how to make the 
accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU more smoothly rather than 
innovating new options for the settlement of the conflict. The stance of the 
European Union with regard to any conflict settlement policy turns out as an 
insistence on the Turkish Cypriot side to make initial offers and demands on 
the items of conflict. The European Union promises to respond with very low 
offers such as in the offer of a very low annual financial aid in return of a 
settlement that is favourable to the European Union’s enlargement project16. 
For a settlement acceptable for the EU the Turkish Cypriots needs to be 
forced to concede to the Greek Cypriot demands.  The European Union as a 
competitive negotiator makes continuos demands of concessions from the 
TRNC and Turkey and backs up its demands with threats17. The European 
Union also magnifies the Helsinki decisions as a big concession made for the 
Turkish side and downplays Denktaş’s move by re-initiating the bicommunal 
talks since in the Helsinki decisions the settlement of the conflict was officially 
removed as a precondition to the EU membership of the island. 
 
 As the time to close the accession negotiations with South Cyprus 
draws closer, the resumed talks between the leaders of two communities 
appears as the final chance to have a settlement before the end of 2002. The 
EU has shown its support for the success of the talks, but the rhetoric that the 
re-initiated bi-communal talks would have no effect on the accession 
procedure of the RoC into the EU irritates the Turkish Cypriot administration 
as the initiator of the talks after a two years’ halt in a situation where the 
Greek Cypriots seem to stick to their positions until the EU presidency passes 
                                                          
16 According to Financial Times, the amount of financial aid to be given to North Cyprus 
would be determined according to the results of the bicommunal talks. North Cyprus, being 
under the EU's financial aid program for the first time; is planned to have 39 million Euros for 
2004 and this amount can rise up to 100 million Euros in the following two years. (January 
27,2002) 
17 Verheugen in a speech in Athens threatened Turkey with abating the membership 
procedures of the country in the case of a Turkish threat on the membership of the RoC. 
(www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 22,2002). 
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to Greece18 at the end of 2002.  It can be assessed that the closing deadline 
for the accession talks became one of the main motives for Denktaş to re-
initiate the bilateral negotiations among the primary parties but the EU factor 
seems to be a negative reinforcer.  
  
3.2 What awaits the European Union? 
 
A discrepancy seems to be revealed within the EU on the issue of how 
to pursue policies in order to keep up with its high principles/promises of 
security and stability. The case of Cyprus is a challenge to the EU to reflect 
the convergence of its policies with its promises by adjusting its enlargement 
process with its evolving common foreign and security policy. 
 
The Cyprus conflict reveals two major contradictions, one on the 
theoretical level and another one on the policy level. The enlargement 
process of the Union has come into a controversy with the high principles of 
the Union in Cyprus. One of the main building blocks of the European Union 
is its offer of stability and security to its future members. The European Union 
is an opportunity of cohesion and reconciliation based on a unanimous 
operating decision-making system. In order to preserve the inner 
cohesiveness and consensus, the Union does not have the luxury to let new 
member states bring in their protracted conflicts into the Union without a 
preliminary settlement of their disputes within or without-that includes any 
dispute with a neighbouring country. But the present interested secondary 
party position of the Union seems to be far from easing the tension alienating 
the Northern Cypriot government from the European Union, whereas the time 
schedule to close the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots creates 
an extra tension for a quick settlement to the 30-year-old conflict. The Union 
does not want to import any conflict into its system19. But its insistence to 
keep on with the accession negotiations and official willingness to accept 
South Cyprus as a member state regardless of a settlement in the conflict 
                                                          
18 Denktaş criticised the speeches of EU commissioner Verheugen and condemned him for 
ignoring the realities and the history of the Cyprus conflict.( www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 23, 
2002) 
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reduces the chance of a fast settlement before the end of the accession 
negotiations. That means the European Union will have to import an 
unresolved conflict into its system so as to preserve it internal cohesiveness 
and unanimous order in the foothold of its enlargement project. That is the 
first major contradiction of the European Union that hinders it to attain a 
neutral and flexible third party-mediator role in the island. 
 
The second major contradiction is on the policy level. The enlargement 
process and the common foreign and security policy of the European Union 
came at a point of controversy. This difference of acting can be observed in 
the public speeches of Gunter Verheugen, the High Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Javier Solana, the chief of the CFPS. They pose different 
views about the effect of settlement within the accession negotiations 
especially in the case of a failure in the resumed talks between Denktaş and 
Clerides. Javier Solana’s remarks in April 2002 on the matter led to a big 
amount of repugnance both in the Greek Cypriot government and the media. 
Solana’s remarks can be viewed as the announced hardship of a settlement 
before December 2002 and that the EU will be compelled to take only the 
southern part of the island as its future member20. That means the ultimate 
partition of the island shall be recognised by the European Union by 
accepting only one part of Cyprus. Another fierce response to Solana’s 
remarks came from Gunter Verheugen as the chief of enlargement for the EU 
by claiming that the EU is always for the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus21.  
 
As foreign policy matters require pragmatism it can be assessed that the chief 
of CFSP acted realistically but still Verheugen had to speak for the high principles of 
the EU. Such a verbal clash between the two signals a bitter fact that the EU is on the 
verge of losing its reliability in the Cyprus conflict at its cost. However such minor 
verbal clashes signals bigger internal communication/decision-making problems with 
regard to the pursuit of policies that would stand in the EU’s strife to become a 
more influential political entity on the management of international conflicts.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
19 The chief of enlargement high commissioner Verheugen’s remarks on the TV program 
“Newsnight” on BBC that the EU would not be importing any conflict in the case of RoC 
membership. (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 17,2002). 
20 To Vima, April 20,2002 
21 www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 21,2002 
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2002 is a crucial year for Cyprus. If the European Union is keen on its 
principles it is now high time to act in a more positively pro-active manner. 
The Union should seek ways to remove the evidently diverging perceptions of 
the principles with its policies. The Cyprus conflict offers a great opportunity 
to the EU to show its willingness and ability to play as a more active global 
policy maker.  
 
The pro-Greek Cypriot attitude of the EU can be articulated as a 
necessity to keep the consensus on the eastern enlargement project. This is 
a major irony that the EU sacrifices its major principle of security for the sake 
of continuing with its eastern enlargement project, which promises prosperity, 
stability and security. As a result of this irony the EU has only one tool to play 
for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict before the Southern part becomes a 
member of the Union. It is the same tool that forces the Union to solve a 
possible crisis; the accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. Today 
the EU as an interested secondary party seems to have no other choice but 
to trust on the effect of this negative reinforcer on the TRNC, the so-called 
catalytic effect of the accession negotiations. In other words the sole conflict 
resolution instrument of the Union is the enlargement project of the Union 
(See Figure3.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3.4 How the unanimous decision making system of the EU limits the 
use of flexible policy tools 
 
Unfortunately using a project as a catalyser is a very passive form of 
foreign policy involvement that might have different meanings to the primary 
parties of the conflict. Moreover emphasising the benefits of the process for 
one of the parties whereas using a continuously punitive and intimidating 
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rhetoric for the other party does not put the EU into a trustworthy and neutral 
position for the other primary party. 
 
The biggest obstacle of the European Union in Cyprus is its inability to 
divorce the enlargement process from its foreign policy making. The conflict 
settlement efforts of the Union if any is being dominated by the necessity of 
preserving the internal consensus for the realisation of the eastern 
enlargement project. The ideal position of the Union within the Cyprus conflict 
would be that of a mediator that could follow a combination of conflict 
resolution policies for the benefit of the both conflicting parties. But for that 
the Union should stop treating the eastern enlargement project as a foreign 
policy tool in the island and set it as a framework for the EU’s conflict 
resolution attempts. 
 
In the next chapter the enlargement project of the European Union is 
presented as a feasible framework for conflict management activities. 
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CHAPTER IV: ENLARGEMENT PROJECT AS A FEASIBLE FRAMEWORK 
FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT EFFORTS IN CYPRUS 
 
Today the European Union is the most feasible framework for the 
settlement of the Cyprus conflict. The EU should present the enlargement 
project as a common future for the two primary parties. Majority of the Turkish 
Cypriot community believes that the EU membership is an opportunity that 
must somehow be grasped22. With an acceptable settlement the EU 
membership would upgrade the TRNC economy and the GDP of the citizens 
would rise to the level of the European Union countries. But for the realisation 
of this dream the EU should first of all present the enlargement project as a 
balanced framework for both of the primary parties and then act as a neutral 
mediator working on that. In this chapter the enlargement project is discussed 
as a framework for the conflict management efforts of the EU as a neutral 
third party.  
 
4.1 Perceiving the Enlargement as a Framework rather than as a Foreign 
Policy Tool 
 
The major handicap of the European Union in the Cyprus conflict is the 
discrepancy between the enlargement project and the foreign policy of the 
Union. The foreign policy involvement of the Union in terms of conflict 
resolution efforts is limited with the on-going accession negotiations with the 
RoC. Nevertheless the enlargement project has acted as a catalyser in the 
reinitiation of the talks between Denktaş and Clerides in December 2001. 
However that does not mean the enlargement project can be used a foreign 
policy tool.  
                                                          
22 Opinion polls among Turkish Cypriots have consistently shown large majorities in favour of the EU. 
According to a poll conducted in December 1997 by the independent Cyprus Public Opinion and 
Market Research Company (COMAR) 89.6% of Turkish Cypriots declared themselves in favour of 
joining the EU in the expectation that this will confer tangible benefits in such areas as education, 
employment, health, and security. A sizeable majority (76.6%) also believed that EU accession would 
allow Turkish Cypriots to close the economic gap with Greek Cypriots. 
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The EU needs a multidimensional thinking to apply flexible and 
proactive policies for the settlement of the conflict. That would only be 
possible by changing the perception of the EU on the enlargement project. 
The EU as repeatedly told by the EU officials is a project of security, 
prosperity and peace. And the eastern enlargement project is a projection of 
these ideals for the whole continent. To restrict the eastern enlargement as a 
foreign policy tool is shortsightedness. The enlargement project of the EU 
should be put as a dynamic framework on which the Union can build its 
policies on (see Figure4.1). The Union should immediately stop insisting to 
use the enlargement as a foreign policy tool. The European Union must build 
its conflict resolution attempts in Cyprus on top of the enlargement 
framework. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure4.1 Viewing the Enlargement Project as a Framework 
 
Figure4.1 Perceiving the enlargement project as a framework 
 
European Union officials dealing with Cyprus have so far represented 
the enlargement willingly or unwillingly as a project that would work mainly for 
the benefit of the RoC. The EU has made no official contact with the TRNC 
and did not put any official offer. The EU did not dare such a move since the 
international community can perceive any official contact with the Turkish 
Cypriots as the recognition of the TRNC23.  
 
                                                          
23 The UN Security Council Resolution 541,1983. The Council declared the formation of TRNC as 
being ‘incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the RoC and the 1960 
Treaty of Guarantee’. It was declared to be legally invalid (Dodd 1998:80). 
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When used as a foreign policy tool the enlargement project exerts a 
negative tension on the Turkish Cypriot administration and causes frustration 
and fury about the future of the TRNC administration and sovereignty. 
Although the Turkish Cypriot community perceives the large benefits the EU 
membership it causes a continuos threat of stability for the Turkish Cypriots. 
The way this big project of the European Union, which offers security and 
stability to the candidate countries, is presented unfortunately becomes the 
source of instability and ambiguity on the northern part of the island. The rise 
of existentialist concerns in the North causes the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
harden positions on the issues of political equality, sovereignty and security. 
As long as the enlargement project is being introduced as a means of threat 
to the Northern Cypriots the catalytic effect of the EU would only be working 
for the worsening of the situation in the conflict. If the EU is sincere in its 
principles of security, stability and prosperity attached to the enlargement 
project it should stop presenting it as a foreign policy tool in the island and 
look for ways to package and sell the project to the TRNC by taking into 
considerations the needs and concerns of its people. 
 
4.2 How to Transform the Enlargement Project into a More Balanced 
Framework for Both Parties  
 
For the transformation of the enlargement project into a balanced 
framework the European Union has to redefine its role, goals and relations in 
the conflict.  
 
4.2.1 Redefinition of the EU role 
 
The negotiator role of the European Union is not suitable to start the 
transformation of the enlargement project from being treated as a foreign 
policy tool into a balanced framework. The Union has to shift from a 
negotiation role to a mediation role. The mediation role needs a clarification at 
this point; the European Union literally has to act as a neutral mediator 
without any relational preferences with one of the conflicting parties.  
 
One-sided perspective of the EU in the conflict does not add any credit 
to the catalytic effect of the Union. The EU officers in the past announced that 
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the EU is in favour of a settlement in Cyprus but chose to abstain from direct 
action. This choice might be explained by a fear that a neutral but active EU 
could harm the on-going accession negotiations with the RoC and therefore 
the consensus on the eastern enlargement could be damaged. Unfortunately 
with such thinking the EU fails to see the need for multidimensionality in the 
pursuit of global policies. Conducting accession negotiations with one of the 
primary parties of the conflict while not building any direct contact with the 
other party does not make the EU in the Cyprus conflict an active and 
multidimensional policy maker. 
 
4.2.2 Redefinition of the EU Goals 
 
Redefinition of the EU goals in the settlement of the Cyprus conflict 
would enhance the effectiveness of the EU framework. It is true that the 
approaching membership of the Greek Cypriots has been a catalyser in the 
restart of the direct bi-communal talks but what is more important is to evolve 
this catalytic effect into the EU mediation. 
 
Until now the European Union has put the realisation of its enlargement 
project as its main goal in Cyprus. The need for a settlement before the 
accession was removed officially as a precondition at the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit. The main goal of the Union today is solely securing a successful end 
to the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Administration and a 
smooth accession of the first wave of the candidate countries into the Union 
by 2004. Unfortunately the goal of the Union is shaped upon a proposed 
blackmail of Greek veto on the enlargement project if the RoC does not 
appear on the first wave of the accessed candidate countries.  
 
But it can now be observed that the goal of the EU brings higher risks to 
the Union. The Turkish threat of vetoing the deploying the NATO troops and 
sources under the command of the rapid reaction force of the EU carries the 
danger of undermining the long-expected capability of fast intervention in 
ethnic conflicts to protect and promote the European Security. The settlement 
of the Cyprus conflict has become a package deal along with the rapid 
reaction force of the proposed ESDP. Therefore the reluctant stance of the 
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Union in Cyprus does not add any value to the foreign policy of the Union and 
the principles of the enlargement project, instead works to widen up the 
discrepancy between these two.  
 
 The Union policy within the conflict is stuck between the two threats of 
vetoes by the mainlands of the conflict. The new goal of the European Union 
should be designed as to remove the double-veto threat in front of the 
enlargement. The way to salvation is possible by attaining a more balanced 
stance in the conflict. If the European Union commissioners announce that 
the Union wants to see a feasible settlement of the conflict as the most 
important building block of a unified Cyprus as a future member of the Union, 
that would increase the credibility of the European Union in the Turkish 
Cypriot eyes and would thus enable the Union to exercise leverage equally 
on both communities to bring a joint settlement of the conflict 
 
The EU has to redefine its preferences about the shape of a settlement 
in the Cyprus conflict. The membership of a united Cyprus is a necessity for 
the transformation of the enlargement project into a framework. The new 
framework should be promoting the membership of the new partnership into 
the EU. It has to guarantee the membership of the island into the Union. 
Therefore the goal of the Union has to be renovated towards a feasible 
settlement of the conflict. It is obvious that the Greek Cypriot membership will 
be problematic and be challenged legally and politically by Turkey and 
Turkish Cypriots. The costs are too high for the European Union in the case 
of a non-settlement.  
 
4.2.3 Rebuilding the EU’s relations with the Primary Parties 
 
A change on the relational bonds of the Union would be the most 
decisive move towards transforming the enlargement project into a feasible 
framework. With its current relational bonds the EU as an interested 
secondary party, the Union lacks the capacity to realise the needed 
transformation. The EU should be at a neutral distance from the primary 
parties. The positional shift of the EU from an interested secondary party to a 
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neutral third party will have the following advantages in the practice 
mediation: 
 
(1) The new position of the Union would bring symmetry into the on-going 
negotiations between the two leaders of Cyprus. With the removal of the 
EU backing on Greek Cypriot propositions the Turkish Cypriot 
administration would feel more secure during the talks. The feeling of 
security would encourage more flexible moves from the Turkish Cypriots 
towards a joint settlement whereas the Greek Cypriot counterpart would 
have to focus more on easing their reservation points on the issues of 
divergence such as sovereignty and distribution of the territories. The 
most favourable condition for successful negotiations is the situation of 
power-equality defined as the reciprocity; a responsive taking of 
concessions for a convergent outcome (Bartos, 1978). The enlargement 
framework will provide the needed symmetry into the ongoing 
negotiations.  
 
(2) The neutral position would encourage the European Union work on the 
level of interests rather than at the level of positions. The Union would be 
relieved from the obstacles that prevent it to attain flexible policies.  
 
(3) The European Union will be able to add its own ideas and perceptions of a 
positive outcome when there is none and use its own power to move the 
parties toward an agreement and its own resources to come up with a 
sum positive to attract both parties’ agreement. 
 
4.3Conclusion 
  
In this chapter transformation of the enlargement project into a 
balanced framework is put as the needed base for the EU to apply conflict 
settlement/resolution policies. The enlargement framework would erase the 
discrepancy between the ideals and the policy of the Union in the Cyprus 
conflict. Enlargement project so far has been treated as a foreign policy tool 
and proved its inadequacy in terms of a conflict management method. It is 
assessed that if the European Union can redefine its role, its goals and its 
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relations with the primary parties of the conflict, it will be able to make the 
needed transformation of the enlargement project into a conflict resolution 
framework whereby the EU can act as a mediator. 
 
 In the next chapter the possible mediator roles of the EU is provided 
with definitions derived from the international mediation literature and 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER V: MEDIATOR ROLES FOR THE EU IN CYPRUS  
 
The European Union has so far ceased to play the role of a third party 
mediator for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict. The ineffective policy of the 
EU can be explained with reference to a major discrepancy between the 
principles of its enlargement project and its implementation in the case of 
Cyprus. The unanimous decision-making system has compelled the Union to 
act against both the principles of the European Union and the promises of the 
enlargement project. But the conflict resolution field offers alternative foreign 
policy tools in the are of international mediation. 
 
As it was mentioned in Chapter2, international mediation is defined as a 
reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance 
of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organisation to 
change their behaviour, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without 
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch 
1996). First of all the Cyprus conflict has been going on for about forty years 
now; the efforts of individuals or actors have reached an impasse; none of the 
disputants is prepared to stand further costs or the escalation of the conflict. 
With the end of the accession negotiations with the South Cyprus 
approaching the 2002 is the most suitable time to act for the EU. With the 
enlargement project treated as a framework that offers security and stability 
EU has the potential to act as a mediator As an international political entity 
the European Union possesses the enough potency to offer mediation to the 
primary parties of the Cyprus conflict. But for the acceptance of the offer by 
both of the primary parties the position of the EU should be neutral. That 
means if the EU gets inclined to use its mediation potential it should first 
change its position within the conflict form an interested secondary party to a 
neutral third party.  
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There are different perspectives about the mediator’s role in the Conflict 
Resolution literature. Kressel in 1972 defined a typology to categorize 
mediator behaviour ranging from passive to assertive in three strategies: (1) 
reflective behavior, (2) nondirective behaviour, and (3) directive behaviour. 
But for a flexible foreign policy the EU should not withhold from using a 
combination of the strategies of these three different mediator behaviour 
models in the Cyprus conflict. 
 
The reflective strategy is the most passive category. Mediator acting in 
this category aims to reduce the degree of complexity and uncertainty in the 
conflict, by providing knowledge and information about the conflicting issues 
and parties. According to Bercovitch the mediator strives to “ achieve some 
convergence of expectations by reducing distortion, ignorance, 
misperception, or unrealistic intentions” (1984:98). The EU should make clear 
to both of the primary parties that the EU favours open dialogue among the 
parties and is ready to set the issues of conflict for realistic sessions of 
negotiations among the two communities. As a neutral third party the EU can 
announce that both the TRNC and the RoC should avoid from giving 
messages that might distort the efficacy of the bi-communal talks.  
 
 Nondirective behaviour is a more proactive involvement in which the 
conflicting parties will arrive at a mutually acceptable solution with a minimum 
help from the mediator. In this category mediator can control publicity of the 
conflict management environment (by providing a neutral place for the 
mediation) and the resources (the number and the identity of the parties) to 
affect the structure of the mediation. As a neutral mediator the EU can call all 
of the parties of the conflict including the primary parties (TRNC, RoC) and 
interested secondary parties (Turkey, Greece) to gather at a neutral place- a 
non-EU country in Europe like Norway- in a peace summit. The EU’s job as a 
mediator on such a Cyprus peace summit should be enabling a healthy 
communication among the negotiators and helping the parties work towards a 
compromise solution. 
 
 Ultimately in the directive behaviour the mediator takes an active role to 
encourage a specific solution or seeks to manipulate the parties directly into 
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ending the dispute. Mediator offers proposals or recommendations and exerts 
direct pressure. The EU can also formulate recommendations to overcome 
impasses between the primary parties or can encourage both communities 
and the mainlands seek a settlement to the conflict that would preserve the 
peace in the Eastern Mediterranean and enable the first phase of the eastern 
enlargement. But for the acceptance of the EU settlement proposals all of the 
parties should trust the Union as a neutral third party. Especially the trust of 
the Turkish Cypriots is of severe importance for the mediation of the EU. 
 
Rubin introduced a comprehensive set of dichotomous mediator roles 
like formal vs. informal, impartial vs.partial, individual vs. collective, conflict 
managing vs. conflict escalating, content oriented vs. process oriented 
(1981). To start with the first diad, formal vs. informal the EU should be more 
of an informal mediator than a formal one. As an interested secondary party 
the EU in its foreign policy the EU chooses to use a very formal language, 
focusing on the words used in a statement. But a successful mediator uses 
an informal language to enable a healthier communication between the 
primary parties and the third party. In the classical mainland European 
diplomacy technique that is still followed by the EU formal statements and 
declarations defines the positions of the parties24. But the EU mediation 
should possess informal approach, as a neutral mediator the EU should 
withhold from making formal and public declarations without the formalisation 
of any deal among the disputants. 
 
With regard to the other diad impartial vs. partial, a successful 
mediation for the EU in the Cyprus conflict is possible by attaining impartiality 
towards both of the primary parties. This specific role character is key for an 
effective mediation. Conflicts are of a dynamic nature and have different 
stages of development through time. A conflict might be at a latent stage, 
escalating, at its climax or de-escalating. In each of these phases of conflicts 
different mediator roles might be needed. Therefore at a latent stage or de-
                                                          
24  EC Helsinki ’99 declaration ambiguously defines the EU position about the Cyprus conflict: ‘If no 
settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council’s 
decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this Council 
will take account of all the relevant factors.’ 
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escalating stage collective mediation might be an effective technique. But at 
the late phases of the escalating conflict or when a conflict reaches the 
climax, indiviual mediation might be the right procedure to follow. Now since 
the Cyprus conflict is at the early stages of its escalation the EU can do 
collective mediation; that is by gathering all of the parties around the table. 
The important point at collective mediation is that none of the conflicting 
parties should be in a position to be offended by the presence of its rival 
around the table. At this stage none of the communities feels offended by 
discussing the issues of the conflict. Therefore 2002 is the right time to do 
collective mediation for the EU in Cyprus. 
 
Rubin’s other pair is conflict managing vs. conflict escalating. Some of 
the mediators use conflict escalating strategies as contentious tactics to make 
the parties aware of each other’s positions. That kind of a mediation tactic in 
Cyprus would be like crushing an oil tanker into a depot full of arsenal. 
Therefore EU should be a conflict managing mediator in the island. Conflict 
management in basic terms is the containment of a conflict before it escalates 
and turns into a physical war and cause loss of life. Although the situation in 
Cyprus is at a latent phase for the last 28 years, the very core of the conflict 
remains intact and not managed. So the EU mediation should focus and deal 
with the core issues of the conflict like security, sovereignty, equality, 
redistribution of territory, governance, continuation of the guarantorship 
system and the status of the immigrants. While doing that the EU should 
follow a mix of both content oriented and process oriented approaches. The 
main aim of the EU should be helping the parties continue with the peace 
process, the bi-communal talks for now- without being drowned in the issues 
that are highly controversial for the primary parties. The EU should encourage 
both TRNC and RoC negotiators focus on the issues in which they are on 
closer terms and then work on with the other issues. By that way a real peace 
process in the island can be obtained. 
 
The main responsibility of the mediator is to assist the disputants to find 
a solution, which they are not able to find by themselves. For the success of 
mediation all of the parties should cooperate fully with the mediator. 
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Mediation aims to provide a positive-sum solution unlike the traditional 
competitive adversarial relations that end up with a zero-sum agreement 
(Bercovitch 1996). Mediation seems as a “reciprocal process of social 
interaction in which the mediator is a major participant”(Bercovitch & Houston 
1996). According to Bercovitch all international mediators operate within a 
system of exchange and influence. The parameters of that system can be 
identified as the communication, experience and expectations of the disputing 
parties, and the resources and interests of the mediators. The interplay 
between these parameters determines the nature and effectiveness of 
mediation (1992). The mediator should be acting to make change within the 
parameters of the system. 
 
The Union can work to change the parties’ expectations. Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots hold totally diverse opinions about an ideal settlement of the 
conflict. The European Union should act as an agent of reality and should 
lead both parties to a feasible and commonly beneficial settlement. But before 
pursuing such strategies the EU should make a clear assessment of both 
parties’ expectations and innovate common ground formulas between these 
expectations. These expectations are also closely related with the standing of 
the EU in the conflict.  
 
The EU mediator should take the responsibility for the concessions 
made during the negotiations. The positions of the two sides do not allow 
them to make proportionate concessions. In a negotiation process a party 
does not make any substantial concession unless there is a reciprocal made 
by the other party. And if one of the primary parties is weaker than the other it 
is less willing to make any concessions. In Cyprus conflict what EU has to do 
is to provide guarantee of reciprocity for the Turkish Cypriots that the Greek 
Cypriots would also be led to make concessions from their positions.  
 
One of the major aims of the EU as a mediator should be to change the 
static positional relationship between the parties into a more positive and 
dynamic relationship built on reciprocal give and takes with a European Union 
responsibility for the common benefit in making concessions. One other role 
mediator is to suggest concession parties can make. The European Union’s 
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leverage on the conflict settlement efforts comes from its potential to reward 
the concessions being made by the Cypriot communities. Although EU 
membership is put as the biggest reward the Union should put more concrete 
and detailed rewards. And these detailed and concrete rewards should be 
made visible and approachable for the Turkish Cypriots. These rewards might 
include a huge amount of financial aid, lift of the trade embargo and opening 
a liaison office in Lefkosa. 
 
5.1Conclusion 
 
After setting the enlargement project as a feasible framework for both of 
the primary parties to the conflict. The EU has to become a mediator if it 
really aims to settle the Cyprus conflict. In this chapter possible mediator 
roles have been assessed for the EU. The European Union should use its 
capacity to follow mediation strategies as long as it aims to become a global 
political actor. The Cyprus conflict is a test for the Union.  
 
In the next chapter concluding remarks of this study is presented. 
 49
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter includes the final remarks of this study.  In the past 
chapters an evaluation of the European Union’s involvement in the Cyprus 
conflict is presented. The analysis included the internal decision making 
mechanism of the Union and the policies of the Union in the Cyprus conflict.  
 
6.1 Why Cyprus? 
 
The Cyprus conflict is a remarkable example since it best represents 
the discrepancy between the principles and the policies of the Union as a 
result of the failure of the decision-making system. The approach of the 
European Union operates on a procedural level in the shape of dossier 
exchange. The unanimous order of the Union does not permit the Union to 
adopt flexible and innovative polices. The internal cohesiveness of the Union 
has to be preserved in the eastern expansion of the Union and the Union has 
chosen to act within the parameters of the accession negotiations in its 
contacts with the candidate countries.  
 
The problem with Cyprus arises from the conflictual nature of the 
country. Being divided for about a 30 years now the name, the Republic of 
Cyprus does not represent the whole island as it’s being used solely by the 
Greek Cypriot government whereas the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
remains as an unrecognised state for almost 20 years. The European Union 
did not take the conflictual nature of the island of Cyprus into account and 
preferred to follow a procedural policy with the accession negotiations with 
South Cyprus. With the continuation of this policy the EU hopes to maintain 
the internal consensus of the Union on the issue of eastern enlargement.  
 
The accession negotiations proceed on the expected timeline and with 
the fulfilment of dossiers and do not leave any space for any innovative and 
flexible moves. The European Union made its policies captive of the deadline 
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for the need of the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot 
administration. It is evident that the enlargement project has acted as a 
catalyst for the re-initiation of the bi-communal talks. But the lack of any 
positive outcome so far can be regarded as the result of the interested 
secondary party position of the Union. In order to keep the consensus on the 
enlargement project the EU chose to support the Greek Cypriot approach. 
The Union removed the conditionality of a settlement prior to the accession 
whereas the Turkish Cypriot side was treated in a rather punitive approach 
with conditionality. The European Union policies are about to import a 
conflict-torn country into the Union. Such an accession signals a strategic 
mistake for the European Union since the European Union has now been 
stuck between the double-veto threat both form Turkey and Greece. The 
expansion and security build-up came at a controversy. The Greece 
threatens the eastern expansion of the Union whereas Turkey threatens main 
building block of the European Defence and Security Policy, rapid reaction 
force.  
 
6.2 The Big Picture 
 
The reluctance of the European Union in taking direct action is one of 
the biggest obstacles in the transatlantic alliance. In the past decade as a 
result of this reluctance the European Union did not manage to intervene 
successfully to the ethnic conflicts within and without the European mainland. 
The United States determines the timing and the shape of the intervention 
and the Europeans get involved into the framework later after the rough part 
of the intervention is being made. After the incident of September 11, the 
search for ways to enhance the communication between the USA and the EU 
has gained an impetus.  
 
The fallacy of the European Union is that it depends too much on 
classical diplomatic tools such as bilateral negotiations and classical Kantian 
belief on the ultimate good of strengthening the economic relations within the 
framework of a planned outset. It is obvious that the European Union fails to 
see the inefficacy of these policies in the Cyprus conflict as it misses the need 
for multi-dimensional policies. The trust in the accession negotiations limits 
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the capacity of the Union to take the needed direct action in the conflict 
settlement efforts. The belief in the ultimate good of the economic gains 
achieved by the EU membership is perceived as being enough of a 
temptation for the easing of the tension in the island. The Union has framed 
the conflict within the procedural liens of the accession negotiations and 
insisted on going with the same policy until this time. Taking any direct and 
flexible action would mean distorting from the accession process. The fear 
about the failure of the enlargement project is an understandable issue for the 
EU but the dilemma of widening versus deepening has invaded any attempts 
to make the Union reach at a higher level of political entity.  
 
The decision making structure of the Union is unanimous and to keep 
the consensus requires inner negotiations within the Union. Any member of 
the Union has the right of veto on the foreign policy of the Union. Always a 
common ground has to be searched in the policies of the Union to satisfy all 
of the members. Therefore any determined move carries the danger of 
destructing the consensus. The classical procedural European approach 
does not produce any positive outcome. Using high words, making references 
to the principles of the Union does not put the Union in a position to take 
direct action to achieve these liberal goals.  
 
6.3 Final Remarks 
 
The European Union has defined its aim as a political entity that 
implements global policies promoting the liberal principles of peace, stability 
and prosperity. But none of these principles is being successfully promoted 
with the current policy making system of the EU. The system compels the 
Union to follow one- dimensional procedural policies that are increasingly 
unable to meet the flexibility and multi-dimensionality required in the 
conflictual regions with and without Europe. The insistence on the pursuit of 
the one dimensional, procedural policy causes a discrepancy between the 
principles and the policies of the Union. But the European Union can remove 
this discrepancy by adopting conflict resolution policies. The analysis and 
offers of this study would help the Union in its evolution towards becoming a 
political entity.  
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